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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970565-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered upon a plea of guilty to the 
charge of theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This case presents a single issue for review: whether the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after finding that the prosecutor's factual 
clarification before imposition of sentence and commentary afterward did not violate the 
State's promise in the plea agreement to submit the matter to the court without comment 
as to sentencing. 
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be disturbed on appeal only if 
this Court finds an abuse of discretion. State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Trujillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (1992). An abuse of discretion exists when it can be said that the lower court acted 
beyond the bounds of reasonability. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, 
including Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) (attached in addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on February 4, 1997, with receiving stolen property, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995); driving under 
the influence, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 
1997); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) (R. 1-2). On July 21, 1997, he entered into a plea 
agreement with the State, pursuant to which he would plead guilty to theft, a class A 
misdemeanor, and the State would drop the remaining charges and submit the case to the 
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sentencing court without making any comment as to sentencing (R. 64-72) (a copy of the 
agreement is attached in addendum B).1 
At the sentencing hearing on September 8, 1997, defendant addressed the 
presentence report and its recommendation of a one-year jail term, arguing that 
incarceration, if any, should run concurrent to his sentences in other local matters and that 
he should be given credit for having already served more than a year in jail (R. 157-58) (a 
copy of the September 8 hearing transcript is attached in addendum C). The State then 
clarified that the time defendant claimed to have served arose from a number of different 
cases and explained the amount of time defendant had actually served in this case (R. 
158-59). Addendum C. Defendant agreed, and the court then imposed a 90-day jail 
sentence independent of defendant's other sentences, refusing to put defendant on 
probation for this offense (R. 7, 160, 165). Addendum C. 
Defendant immediately sought a one-week stay of execution of the sentence so he 
could be available for his step-father's surgery, could put his personal affairs in order, and 
could return the truck he was driving to his California employer (R. 157-58, 165). 
Addendum C. The lower court sought the prosecutor's input, and the State explained its 
objection to such a stay (R. 165-67). Addendum C. Defendant then made a verbal 
Several documents in the file after entry of the plea reflect that defendant pled 
guilty to four charges (R. 62-63, 74-76, 81-82, 85, 104). However, defendant in fact pled 
guilty to and was sentenced for only one offense (R. 66-72, 87-89). 
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motion to withdraw the plea based on the prosecutor's alleged violation of the plea 
agreement, and the court orally granted the motion and set the matter for trial (R. 167).2 
Addendum C. The State thereafter objected, and the court vacated its initial verbal order 
on the motion and set the matter for hearing on September 16 (R. 171-74). Addendum C. 
At the subsequent hearing, the parties and the court reviewed the videotape of the 
September 8 hearing (R. 184-86). After hearing arguments, the lower court denied the 
motion to withdraw the plea and reinstated the sentence imposed at the earlier hearing (R. 
186-97) (a copy of the court's ruling is attached in addendum D). Defendant again sought 
a stay in order to attend to his personal affairs and to return to his employer the truck he 
had again driven from California (R. 200-01). The court granted him a three-day stay (R. 
202).3 
Defendant timely appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
2The court's grant of the motion to withdraw the plea was based on the 
prosecutor's initial clarification of the facts surrounding the jail time served by defendant, 
not on the response to the one-week stay (R. 172). 
3Although defendant has long-since served his 90-day jail sentence in this matter, 
it appears from this record that this appeal is not moot. "'[A] criminal case is moot only 
if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be 
imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.'" State v. Martinez. 925 P.2d 176, 177 
(Utah App. 1996) (quoting Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1900 
(1968)), cert, denied. 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997). Defendant had at least two prior felony 
convictions in this State for which he was on probation at the time of sentencing in this 
case (R.165, 201). The prosecutor noted that this conviction, together with one from 
California, would likely form the basis for parole revocation proceedings (R. 203). 
Consequently, collateral consequences are possible based on this misdemeanor plea, 
permitting appellate review in this case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, who lived in California, appeared for a court hearing in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in Parowan, Utah, on February 3, 1997 (R. 3, 14, 120). However, 
he arrived at court in a 1993 Cadillac Deville that had been stolen from a California auto 
dealer, and was accompanied by two prostitutes (R. 14, 125-28, 131, 165). The three had 
shared crack cocaine and marijuana during their trip from California, and had stopped for 
a champagne breakfast in Mesquite, Nevada, before continuing to the Parowan 
courthouse (R. 14, 131-32). Defendant was arrested at the courthouse, blood and urine 
tests were positive for both cocaine and marijuana, and the two prostitutes, who were 
found in the car in the parking lot of the courthouse, confirmed that defendant drove them 
to Utah and that the pipe found on one of them belonged to defendant and was used to 
smoke the cocaine (R. 14, 123-26, 131-32). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
because the State did not violate the plea agreement. The prosecutor's comments to the 
lower court prior to imposition of sentence were in response to defendant's muddled 
argument seeking credit for time he had already spent in jail. The comments were aimed 
at clarifying the facts bearing on computation of the amount of time served in light of the 
fact that defendant had also been serving time on other cases. Defendant made no 
objection to the clarification but agreed with it. These comments do not violate the plea 
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agreement as they constitute a clarification of factual matters which are not reasonably 
encompassed by the language used in the agreement. 
Immediately after the court pronounced sentence, defendant sought a one-week 
stay of the sentence. The court asked the State's opinion, and the prosecutor opposed the 
stay. The prosecutor's comments do not violate the plea agreement as the agreement 
does not relate to post-sentence comments not aimed at influencing the sentence 
determination already made by the court. The prosecutor's objection to a week-long stay 
did not amount to an argument seeking imposition of a "greater" sentence, but merely 
addressed a matter of convenience to defendant. Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments 
did not warrant withdrawal of defendant's plea. 
Should this Court deem the plea agreement breached by any of the prosecutor's 
comments, the Court should set aside the sentence and remand for re-sentencing with the 
benefit of the bargain. The State's promise was not illusory, and the bargain is fully 
capable of being performed upon remand. Alternatively, the sentence should be set aside 
and the matter remanded for the lower court to determine whether the breach warrants 
specific performance or withdrawal of the plea. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NEITHER THE PROSECUTOR'S CLARIFICATION OF THE FACTS 
SURROUNDING COMPUTATION OF TIME SERVED NOR HIS OBJECTION 
AFTER IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE TO A STAY OF THE SENTENCE 
VIOLATES THE STATE'S PROMISE UNDER THE PLEA AGREEMENT; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR ANY ALLEGED 
BREACH IS RE-SENTENCING 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. Specifically, he claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
making two comments at sentencing which amounted to a sentencing recommendation. 
Br. of Aplt. at 6-7. Defendant argues that the first comment—clarifying facts concerning 
computation of time served by defendant on this and previous cases—reflected on the 
presentence investigation report [PSI] and, hence, was potentially damaging to 
defendant's position at sentencing. Id at 6. Defendant claims that the second comment-
outlining the State's objection, at the court's request, when defendant sought a furlough 
before reporting to jail for his sentence—involved a matter important to defendant and was 
designed to have the court impose "a greater 'punishment'" on defendant. IcL at 6-7. 
However, both of these claims are without merit. 
A. Applicable Law 
In Utah, "a plea's presumption of validity is strong.'1 State v. Thurston. 781 P.2d 
1296, 1301 (Utah App. 1989). To withdraw a plea of guilty, a defendant must show good 
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cause. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2)(a) (1997). Withdrawal of a guilty plea, however, is 
a privilege, not a right, and is left to the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Gallegos, 
738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will 
be disturbed on appeal only if this Court finds an abuse of discretion. State v. Blair, 868 
P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993); State v. Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (1992). An abuse of discretion exists when it can be 
said that the lower court acted beyond the bounds of reasonability. State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). This standard bestows upon Utah trial courts wide latitude 
in granting such requests because they are most familiar with the facts and issues in the 
case. State v. Forsyth. 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977). Moreover, because the denial or 
grant of a motion to withdraw a plea is fact determinative, "the trial court's findings of 
fact made in conjunction with its decision [should] not be set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Blair, 868 P.2d at 805. 
R, The Plea Agreement 
While the prosecution must adhere to any plea agreement into which it enters, 
Santobello v. New York. 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971), the defendant 
cannot hold the prosecution to more than it has promised. United States v. Miller, 565 
F.2d 1273 (3rd Cir. 1977). In this case, the prosecutor promised uto make no 
recommendations regarding sentencing (i.e.[,] to submit the matter to the Court without 
comment)." (R. 69). Addendum B. A reasonable interpretation of this language is that 
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the prosecutor was to submit the matter to the trial court without comment as to 
sentencing. Any other reading would render the "regarding sentencing" language 
superfluous. 
This promise is a narrow one. Id, at 1275 ("the promise not to recommend is 
narrow, speaking only as to the sentence to be imposed, whereas a promise to take no 
position speaks to no attempt at all to influence the defendant's sentence"); see also 
United States v. Dickson. 712 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1983) (a promise to make no 
recommendation at sentencing does not cover recommendations made to probation 
officers to prepare presentence reports); United States v. Avery. 621 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 
1980) (a promise to make no recommendation at sentencing does not cover 
recommendations made to probation officers for investigatory purposes), cert, denied. 
450 U.S. 933 (1981). Moreover, it does not stand alone but must be read in conjunction 
with the prosecutor's affirmative duty to correct misstatements made by a defendant or to 
provide relevant information when the court is mistaken regarding vital sentencing issues. 
United States v. Block. 660 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1981), cert, denied. 456 U.S. 907 
(1982);4 see also United States v. Garcia. 544F.2d681 (3rd Cir. 1976) (finding that an 
4The Block court cited the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-6.2 (1980), 
which stated: 
(a) The prosecutor should assist the court in basing its sentence on complete 
and accurate information for use in the presentence report. The prosecutor 
should disclose to the court any information in the prosecutor's files 
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agreement not to take a position on the sentence was not violated when the prosecution 
responded to a factual inquiry from the court). Although the prosecution may negotiate 
away its right to recommend a sentence, it does not have the right to agree to keep silent 
when factual inconsistencies or mistakes occur. Block, 660 F.2d at 1091-92. This latter 
right was not relinquished by the language used in this case. 
On two occasions, the prosecutor in this case addressed the court during the 
sentencing hearing. The first communication was made prior to pronouncement of 
sentence, addressed defendant's argument seeking credit for time served, and merely 
clarified facts surrounding the subject without opposing the grant of such credit. The 
second communication came after the court imposed a sentence, was made in response to 
the court's request for input, and involved a one-week stay of the sentence requested by 
defendant. As the following two points demonstrate, neither communication amounted to 
a breach of the plea agreement. 
relevant to the sentence. If incompleteness or inaccurateness in the 
presentence report comes to the prosecutor's attention, the prosecutor 
should take steps to present the complete and correct information to the 
court and to defense counsel. 
The 1993 revised version is essentially the same. 
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C. No Breach Occurred When The Prosecutor Clarified For The Trial Court The 
Factual Details Surrounding Time Already Served By Defendant 
At sentencing, defense counsel began by outlining concerns about the presentence 
investigation report (R. 155-56). Defense counsel then argued as follows: 
Another comment with regard to the report is there is a recommendation 
that he [defendant] serve his one year term-a one year term for the misdemeanor 
offense with that to run concurrent with the concurrent charges that are before the 
court for which he is on probation. I want to point out to the court that despite 
what you might do in this proceeding today, he'll still be on probation unless some 
other proceedings with regard to that occur. But if in fact his term runs concurrent 
with the probation, I believe he's already served the one year. He indicates to me 
that he's served some seven months awaiting trial in the custodial interference 
case, and has now served some 158 days since—since his arrest on this matter, 
which to me adds up to more than a year's period of time which he would have 
served in any event. 
(R. 157). Addendum C. Defendant then requested a one-week furlough in the event of 
incarceration, and closed his initial remarks by pointing out the State's promise under the 
plea agreement (R. 158).5 Addendum C. 
In response, the prosecutor acknowledged the plea agreement, then limited his 
comments to clarifying only the subject of credit for time served. The prosecutor 
addressed the nature of the time defendant had spent in jail and its relationship to the 
instant case, specifically noting that: 1) all the time defendant was incarcerated in this 
case occurred before the guilty plea was entered; 2) the 158 days defendant implies was 
5This was apparently designed to alert the prosecutor to the promise to make no 
sentencing recommendation because the prosecutor at sentencing was not the one who 
negotiated the plea (R. 67, 153, 158). 
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served in this matter in fact reflects "the total time he spent incarcerated" on this and 
previous matters; and 3) the appropriate period to be credited should be the time spent 
incarcerated on this specific matter (R. 158-60). Addendum C. Defendant made no 
response or objection to this argument except to admit that the prosecutor correctly 
clarified that the 158-day period pertained to all three cases, not just this one (R. 159-60). 
Addendum C. 
At the subsequent hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, the trial 
court reviewed the video tape of the earlier hearing, listened to the parties' arguments, 
then determined that the prosecutor's comments constituted a clarification meant "to help 
the court see what the recommendation of the pre-sentence report was and to maybe try to 
decide whether [defense counsel's] point was accurate that if he was—if the court 
followed that recommendation [defendant] may have already served his time." (R. 196). 
Addendum D. The court went on to explain: 
I don't think that that was harmful to [defendant]. I don't think it was intended to 
prejudice him in any way. It was a clarification. In fact, I think [defense counsel] 
ended up basically agreeing with [the prosecutor] as to the way the time would be 
applied.... I don't see that his comment in trying to help the court understand the 
recommendation of the pre-sentence report was in any way intended to influence 
the court's judgment as to what the ultimate sentence should be. 
(R. 196-97). Addendum D. 
A review of the exchange in context supports the trial court's determination. The 
prosecutor's comments neither challenged nor concurred in the PSI's sentencing 
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recommendation. Neither did they attack defendant's character or demonstrate that he 
was deserving of serious punishment. See, e.g.. United States v. Greenwood. 812 F.2d 
632, 636 (10th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's sentencing argument noting defendant's lack of 
remorse and the need to deter others from committing similar crimes violated plea 
agreement not to indicate to the sentencing court that defendant should be incarcerated); 
United States v. Crusco. 536 F.2d 21, 25 (3rd Cir. 1976) (prosecutor's sentencing remarks 
violated plea agreement not to take a position on sentencing when they portrayed 
defendant "as a major figure in organized crime who would endanger the community"). 
Instead, the comments merely addressed the factual circumstances surrounding 
defendant's incarceration and clarified the representations previously made by defense 
counsel concerning whether a concurrent sentence would result in defendant's immediate 
release. This type of clarification is not reasonably included in the State's narrow 
agreement not to make a sentencing recommendation. See Block. 660 F.2d at 1092-93 
(prosecutor's pre-sentence statements that defendant had not filed corporate income tax 
returns and had not paid corporate income taxes merely "corrected factual misstatements" 
made by defendant during the sentencing hearing). 
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On the basis of this record, the prosecutor did not breach his responsibilities under 
the plea agreement and defendant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. Garcia. 544 
F.2d at 685 n.2.6 
EX No Breach Occurred When The Prosecutor Voiced A Post-Sentence Objection To 
Defendant's Requested Stay 
As part of his comments to the trial court before his sentence was announced, 
defendant remarked that if the court chose to imprison him, he would like a one-week 
period in which to travel to California and put his personal matters in order before being 
required to report to the jail to serve his sentence (R. 157-58). Addendum C. Neither the 
trial court nor the prosecutor commented on this request until after the court pronounced 
sentence, at which point the following occurred: 
[THE COURT:] You're already on probation to this court in two other 
cases. I see no reason to impose probation terms in this case. Instead I'm going to 
sentence you to serve 90 days in the county jail. When that's done this case is 
over. You're committed to the custody of the sheriff to serve that time. 
6To the extent that defendant argues that the prosecutor's comments presented him 
to the court in a bad light, the argument is meritless. The prosecutor's mention of 
defendant's prior convictions presented nothing that was not already in the PSI, especially 
where the prior convictions were all in the same court as the charges for which defendant 
was being sentenced (R. 159-60, 165, 203). The prosecutor's comments might well 
prevent the court from making a mistake in calculating time served if it chose to grant 
such credit, but they do not appear reasonably designed to persuade the court not to grant 
the credit at all. Defendant has no right, even under a plea agreement, to be sentenced 
based on erroneous information beneficial to him. See Block, 660 F.2d at 1091 (noting 
the prosecutor's affirmative duty to provide correct information when the court is 
mistaken on sentencing issues). 
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[DEFENDANT]: Can I have one week, your Honor? 
THE COURT: What's the State's response to a one week delay so that he 
can be with his father—step-father? 
(R. 165). Addendum C. The prosecutor responded to the court's question by stating his 
objection to the delay, noting that defendant had not earned any "compassionate leave" 
based on the harm suffered by the victims in his three criminal cases, on past difficulties 
getting him to voluntarily appear at court or at AP&P, and on the questionable conditions 
under which his rare appearances have occurred (R. 165-66).7 Addendum C. 
Defendant complains that these comments violated the plea agreement because: 1) 
they were made during the sentencing hearing in the face of an agreement "to make no 
comment whatsoever at the time of sentencing"[;] and 2) they urged imposition of "a 
greater 'punishment'" because immediate commitment would prevent him from handling 
personal matters before going to jail. Br. of Aplt. at 6-7. However, neither of these bases 
has merit. 
First, defendant's interpretation of the plea agreement is inaccurate and 
unreasonable. A plain reading of the State's agreement—"to make no recommendations 
regarding sentencing (i.e.[,] to submit the matter to the Court without comment)"—which 
7For example, this case arose from defendant's appearance for a court hearing in 
another matter intoxicated, driving a stolen car and accompanied by two prostitutes (R. 
157-58). Two other times in this case, he appeared for sentencing driving a truck owned 
by his California employer and argued that he needed to return it before he could begin 
his sentence (id.). 
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gives meaning to all the words used, binds the prosecutor to submit the matter to the trial 
court without making any comments as to the sentence to be imposed. Nothing in the 
agreement purports to encompass comments made after the lower court announces the 
sentence. The prosecutor refrained from making any comment on this subject until after 
the trial court announced the sentence and did so only then upon direct request of the 
court. The time for commenting on what sentence defendant deserved in this case was 
past, and the prosecutor's comments could not reasonably have been directed at 
convincing the court to change the punishment imposed, the term of imprisonment, or the 
facility to which defendant was committed. Because the terms of the plea agreement at 
hand do not reasonably preclude this type of comment made after the sentencing 
determination, defendant's first argument necessarily fails. 
Defendant relies largely on State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Utah 
1987), to urge that the plea agreement should be "liberally construed" and a breach found. 
Br. of Aplt. at 5, 7. However, Gallegos involved a presentence motion to withdraw the 
plea that was grounded on issues going to the merits of the case. Defendant's motion in 
this case was made only after the lower court pronounced sentence, and it had nothing to 
do with the merits of the case. Accordingly, Gallegos is not persuasive authority for 
holding the prosecutor to more than was promised under a reasonable reading of the plea 
agreement in this matter. 
16 
Second, the prosecutor's comments did not seek to impose a greater punishment 
on defendant. The punishment was set when the lower court announced its sentence—90 
days in jail. A delay in execution of a sentence does not change the length of the sentence 
or the conditions under which it is served.8 A stay of execution of the sort sought here is 
merely a matter of convenience to defendant which need not be considered by the 
sentencing court. See State v. Garcia, 29 Utah 2d 52, 504 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah 1972) 
0'[T]he trial court in a criminal prosecution is granted wide discretion in dealing with the 
defendant after he is convicted, and the statutes grant to the trial court wide powers in 
dealing with a defendant other than pronouncing the sentence provided by law."). Where 
the mere subjective belief of a defendant as to the potential sentence, without a promise or 
some indication by the prosecutor or the court, is insufficient to permit withdrawal of a 
guilty plea, Garfield, 552 P.2d at 130, defendant's mere subjective desire for a stay of his 
sentence after it has been imposed should not support withdrawal of his plea in this case. 
Defendant's failure to obtain the requested delay may have disappointed and 
inconvenienced him, but it did not impermissibly subject him to greater punishment, and 
immediate incarceration objectively is no greater punishment than incarceration 
after one week delay where the former results in defendant's release from jail one week 
earlier than the latter. The fact remains that by choosing to pursue withdrawal of his 
guilty plea below, defendant obtained the week he originally sought (R. 153, 182, 198, 
201). Moreover, he was in California before both the September 8 and 16 hearings (R. 
155-58, 160,200). 
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he is not entitled to withdraw his plea on this basis.9 See Thurston, 781 P.2d at 1302 
(defendant's expectation of a "lesser" sentence or his disappointment in drawing prison 
instead of probation does not justify withdrawal of a plea after sentence has been 
pronounced). 
E. Even Assuming A Violation Of The Plea Agreement At Sentencing, Defendant Is 
Only Entitled To Have His Sentence Set Aside And To Be Re-sentenced With The 
Benefit Of His Bargain 
Defendant seeks withdrawal of his plea upon a determination that the prosecution 
breached its promise to submit the matter to the trial court without comment as to the 
sentence to be imposed.10 Br. of Aplt. at 5-6. However, his argument arises from an 
erroneous premise. He claims that Utah's appellate courts have not addressed the issue 
of whether this type of breach of a plea agreement constitutes good cause to withdraw a 
plea. Br. of Aplt. at 5. However, in State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Utah 1976), 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that if the prosecutor failed to recommend probation 
to the sentencing court as promised in the plea agreement, the defendant would be 
"entitled to have his sentence set aside and to be re-sentenced with the benefit of his 
bargain, viz., a personal recommendation to the court, for probation, by the prosecutor." 
9Defendant faults as "unfounded" the trial court's "finding" that the prosecutor's 
comments on the requested stay of sentence "were harmless and did not affect the 
csentence'[.]" Br. of Aplt. at 7. However, the only finding made by the trial court on this 
point was that the comments were not covered by the plea agreement and, hence, did not 
violate it (R. 194-95). 
10Defendant does not claim that his plea was involuntary or unknowing. 
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In contrast, where the prosecutor's promise is illusory or incapable of being performed, 
withdrawal of the plea is appropriate. See State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-76 
(Utah 1988) (withdrawal permitted where the prosecutor's promise was illusory and 
could not have any effect on the sentencing court under the law in effect at that time). 
The implication is that specific performance of the plea is preferable where it may be had 
without detriment to the parties. It follows that if, by clarifying a factual matter for the 
court prior to imposition of sentence, the prosecutor breached the plea agreement to 
submit the matter for sentencing without comment, the bargain remains capable of being 
performed, and defendant should have his sentence set aside and should be re-sentenced 
with the benefit of his bargain. Garfield. 552 P.2d at 130-31. 
Alternatively, the choice of whether to withdraw a plea or re-sentence the 
defendant should rest with the trial court, "which is in a better position to decide whether 
the circumstances of this case require only that there be specific performance of the 
agreement on the plea . . .or whether . . . the circumstances require granting . . . the 
opportunity to withdraw [the] plea of guilty." Santobello. 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S. Ct. at 
499: see also Greenwood. 812 F.2d at 637; State v. Mathews. 456 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio App. 
1982). Accordingly, should a breach be found to exist, this Court should remand the 
matter to the district court to determine the remedy appropriate under these 
circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
IS C. LEONAI 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
was mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Floyd W. Holm, attorney for appellant, 
965 South Main, Suite 6, Salt Lake City, Utah 84720, thisQ^^day of July, 1998. 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1980, ch. 15, i 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch. ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Rule 
16, fi 1. 65B" for "Rule 65B(i)" in Subsection (3). 
ADDENDUM B 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
REGARDING GUILTY PLEA, 
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL, 
AND ORDER 
Criminal No. 971500112 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING GUILTY PLEA 
r 
lY I, ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, the above-named Defendant, under oath, hereby acknowledge 
that I have entered a plea of guilty to the offense of THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, contained in 
the Amended Information on file against me in the above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have 
received and read, and I understand the nature of the elements of the offense for which I am pleading 
guilty. I further understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is a class A 
misdemeanor, and that T am entering such plea voluntarily and of mv own fi-pp will a<W rnnfrninp 
with my attorney, Floyd W Holm, and with the knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have constitutional rights under the Constitution of Utah and the United 
States to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have entered a plea of 
guilty, or to a trial by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have a right to be 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by Floyd W Holm. 
F y 2. I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the charge, I have a right to be 
confronted by the witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in my presence and 
before the Court and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I 
also know that I have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify in 
Court upon my behalf and that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf, and 
that if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this may not be held against me if I 
choose to have the jury so instructed. 
/jL 3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the State must prove each and every element 
of the crime charged to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would 
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury, whether 
it be that of guilty ur not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of jurors. 
?4. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the United States that I have a 
right against self-incrimination or a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify 
in Court upon trial unless I choose to do so. 
A,f' 5. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury 
or by the Court that I would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court 
of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could not afforu to pay the costs for such 
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the Stalo without cost to me, and to have the assistance of 
counsel on such appeal. 
- 2 * 
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/(Jf6. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty" 
and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving 
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous. I know and understand that by entering this plea of guilty, I am waiving my 
constitutional rights as set out in the preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating 
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
n \ V - I know that under the laws of Utah the possible maximum sentence that can and may 
be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the charge identified on page one of this Statement, and as set 
out in the Amended Information, is as follows: 
(A) Incarceration in the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for a period 
not to exceed one (1) year; and 
(B) Fined in any amount not in excess of two thousand five hundred 
dollars ($2,500), plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge; 
I further understand that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my plea is to more than 
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another 
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. I also know that I may be ordered 
by the Court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my crime. 
I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty does not mean that the Court 
will not impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made 
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead guilty or that it will be made lighter 
because of my guilty plea. 
- 3 -
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9. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me 
to plead guilty, and no promises, except those contained herein, have been made to me. I know that 
any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to what he or they believe the Court 
may do with respect to sentencing are not binding on the Court. 
10. I know that under the laws of Utah should I desire to move the Court to set aside my 
guilty plea entered in this case, I must do so within thirty (30) days of the entry of the plea or my 
right to do so will be lost. I further understand that a plea of guilty may be withdrawn only upon a 
showing of good cause and with permission of the Court. 
1. No promises of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty except that I 
have been told that if I do plead guilty, the State has agreed to file an Amended Information therein 
charging me with THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, as opposed to the original charges of 
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree Felony; DUI, a Class B Misdemeanor; and 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor. Moreover, i am aware mat 
the State of Utah has agreed to make no recommendations regarding sentencing (i.e. to submit the 
matter to the Court without comment). No other promises have been made. I am also aware that 
any charge or sentencing concessions or recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, 
including a reduction of the charge for sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor are not binding on the Court and may not be approved or followed by the Court. 
&ff\2. I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
LC 
Ty 13. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
00063 
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can (^14. I am ^*7years of age, I have attended school through the grade, and I 
read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the influence 
of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants. 
- £ £ 1 5 . I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering 
my plea. 
/X^-46. I have discussed the contents of this Statement with my attorney and ask the Court 
to accept my plea of guilty to the charge set forth in this Statement because I did, in fact, on or about 
February 3, 1997, in Iron County, State of Utah, knowingly and intentionally exercise unauthorized 
control over the property of another (Crestview Cadillac), said property having a value in excess of 
$300. 
DATED this _ day of July, 1997. 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, the Defendant named above, 
and I know he has read the Statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and 
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
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crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing 
Statement, are accurate and true. 
FLO Yiyy HOLM 
Attomeyior Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against ROBERT EDGAR 
FRIIS, Defendant. I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the declarations, 
including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercions 
to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in this Statement or as supplemented on the record before the Court, fhere is reasonaole cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the Defendant for the offense for which the 
plea is entered and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. Finally, I have discussed 
the terms of this agreement with the victim and the investigating agency in this case, and said victim 
and agency fully support and agree with said plea agreement. 
SCOTT M. BTfRNS 
Iron County Attorney 
^4^~~ 
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ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of Defendant Regarding Guilty Plea 
and the foregoing Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and 
voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that Defendant ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS' plea of "guilty" to 
the charge set forth in the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before me this, day 
of July, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
- 7 -
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ADDENDUM C 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT-OF.JIRON COUNTY ' 
STATE OF UTAH ' " 1 47 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, 
DEFENDANT. 
HEARING HELD 
SEPTEMBER 8. 1997 
CASE NO. 971500112 FS 
JUDGE J. PHILIP EVES 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 8TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 
1997, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES, SITTING AS JUDGE IN THE ABOVE-NAMED 
COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CAUSE, AND THAT THE FOLLOWING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
-oOo-
DAVID R. BRICKEY 
DEPUTY IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
FLOYD W. HOLM 
P.O. BOX 765 
CEDAR CITY, UT 84720 
FILED 
MAR - h 1998 
MELINDA ROLLINS COURT OF MPPFALS 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER C H W 
TOS&S^L 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: 970112, STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT 
4 EDGAR FRIIS. MR. FRIIS? WOULD YOU NOTIFY HIM? WHAT HAPPENED 
5 TO THE BAILIFF? 
6 APPARENTLY MR. FRIIS IS NOT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS 
7 OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM MOMENTS AGO. HOW DO YOU WANT TO 
8 PROCEED, MR. BRICKEY? 
9 MR. BRICKEY: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE WOULD ASK FOR A 
10 BENCH WARRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,000 CASH. THE BASIS FOR 
11 THAT IS THE DEFENDANT HAS CURRENTLY BEEN ON PROBATION TWICE, 
12 HE HAS ABSCONDED ON ONE OCCASION, IT APPEARS THAT HE'S NOT 
13 GOING TO BE APPEARING AGAIN. THE ONLY TIME WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO 
14 GET MR. FRIIS' ATTENTION IS WHEN WE SET A BAIL AMOUNT 
15 SIGNIFICANTLY HIGH ENOUGH THAT CALIFORNIA AUTHORITIES DO TAKE 
16 HIM INTO CUSTODY. 
17 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'LL TAKE YOUR MOTION FOR A 
18 $10,000 BENCH WARRANT UNDER SUBMISSION. I'LL REVISIT THE 
19 MATTER ON SECOND CALL. 
20 MR. BRICKEY: THANK YOU. 
21 
22 * * * 
23 
24 THE COURT: 970112, STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT 
25 EDGAR FRIIS. 
n n i */t 
1 MR. FRIIS IS PRESENT WITH HIS COUNSEL, MR. HOLM. 
2 WHERE WERE YOU FOLKS AT 9 O'CLOCK? 
3 MR. HOLM: YOUR HONOR, WE WERE OUT IN THE FOYER, 
4 YOUR HONOR, REVIEWING THE PRE-SENTENCE—WELL, ACTUALLY WE WERE 
5 ACROSS THE HALL IN THE JUSTICE COURTROOM. I APOLOGIZE— 
6 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
7 MR. HOLM: —THAT WE— 
8 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I SAW YOU STANDING OUT THERE 
9 AND THEN I CALLED THE CASE AND NO ONE COULD LOCATE YOU. BUT 
10 IN ANY CASE, I WILL DENY THE STATE'S REQUEST FOR A BENCH 
11 WARRANT AT THIS POINT AND WILL PROCEED WITH SENTENCING. 
12 MR. FRIIS, HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ THE 
13 PRE-SENTENCE REPORT PREPARED IN YOUR CASE? 
14 MR. FRIIS: YES, I HAVE. 
15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ARE THERE ANY STATEMENTS OR 
16 EVIDENCE THAT YOU WISH TO PRESENT? 
17 MR. HOLM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
18 I'VE REVIEWED THE REPORT. I GUESS WE HAVE A COUPLE 
19 OF CONCERNS ABOUT THE REPORT. 
20 THE FIRST CONCERN I HAVE IS WITH REGARD TO WHAT'S 
21 STATED ON PAGE—I BELIEVE IT'S 5—IN THE PROBATION PAROLE 
22 ADJUSTMENT. THERE'S A STATEMENT THERE THAT SAYS THAT ON JULY 
23 10TH OF 1997 THE DEFENDANT POSTED BOND ON THE CURRENT OFFENSE 
24 AND WAS RELEASED FROM THE IRON COUNTY JAIL. ON THAT DATE NOT 
25 ONLY DID HE FAIL TO REPORT TO ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, BUT 
HE RETURNED TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA WITHOUT A TRAVEL 
PERMIT, WHICH ARE ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS OF HIS PROBATION. 
I GUESS THERE'S TWO CONCERNS RAISED BY THAT. IF IN 
FACT THAT IS A VIOLATION OF HIS PROBATION, I THINK THAT'S MORE 
APPROPRIATELY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT IN AN 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDING. 
AND SECONDLY, I JUST WANTED TO POINT OUT TO THE 
COURT THAT MR. FRIIS HAD CONTACT WITH HIS PROBATION OFFICER ON 
SEVERAL OCCASIONS. AND IN FACT, REQUESTED TO SEE HER ON 
SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING HIS INCARCERATION IN THE IRON COUNTY 
JAIL. AT THAT TIME THEY DISCUSSED HIS POTENTIAL BAILING OUT, 
WHAT HE WOULD DO WHEN HE DID, AND I THINK IF NOTHING ELSE IT 
WAS SIMPLY A MISUNDERSTANDING ON HIS PART WHEN HE BAILED OUT 
THAT HE WAS FREE TO GO TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA WHERE HIS 
PARENTS RESIDE AND WHERE HE WAS GOING TO RESIDE WITH THEM. 
AND THAT'S, I THINK, WHAT OCCURRED THERE. 
SO THAT'S—THAT'S CONCERN. OF COURSE, I THINK THAT 
IS THE BASIS FOR THE SCORE OF ADD—OF TWO POINTS ON THE 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT UNDER SUPERVISION RISK WHERE IT 
SAYS ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION. WE WOULD MAINTAIN THAT THAT 
WAS NOT AN INTENTIONAL AND KNOWING ABSCONDING. HE WAS 
AVAILABLE AND PEOPLE KNEW WHERE HE WAS AND THERE WAS A 
MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HE AND THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT. THE 
COURT WILL RECALL WHEN HE CAME TO—WHEN HE CAME TO ENTER HIS 
PLEA IN THIS CASE THAT HE TRIED TO GET THAT QUESTION RESOLVED 
0015 
AS TO WHAT HIS PROBATION SITUATION WAS AND I THINK THAT NOW ON 
HIS MIND THAT IS CLARIFIED AND HOPEFULLY THAT CAN BE RESOLVED. 
ANOTHER COMMENT WITH REGARD TO THE REPORT IS THERE 
IS A RECOMMENDATION THAT HE SERVE HIS ONE YEAR TERM—A ONE 
YEAR TERM FOR THE MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE WITH THAT TO RUN 
CONCURRENT WITH THE CURRENT CHARGES THAT ARE BEFORE THE COURT 
FOR WHICH HE IS ON PROBATION. I WANT TO POINT OUT TO THE 
COURT THAT DESPITE WHAT YOU MIGHT DO IN THIS PROCEEDING TODAY, 
HE'LL STILL BE ON PROBATION UNLESS SOME OTHER PROCEEDINGS WITH 
REGARD TO THAT OCCUR. BUT IF IN FACT HIS TERM RUNS CONCURRENT 
WITH THE PROBATION, I BELIEVE HE'S ALREADY SERVED THE ONE 
YEAR. HE INDICATES TO ME THAT HE'S SERVED SOME SEVEN MONTHS 
AWAITING TRIAL IN THE CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE CASE, AND HAS NOW 
SERVED SOME 158 DAYS SINCE—SINCE HIS ARREST ON THIS MATTER, 
WHICH TO ME ADDS UP TO MORE THAN A YEAR'S PERIOD OF TIME WHICH 
HE WOULD HAVE SERVED IN ANY EVENT. 
YOUR HONOR, HE IS EMPLOYED. HE HAS EMPLOYMENT 
AVAILABLE TO HIM. IN FACT, HAS DRIVEN TO UTAH IN HIS 
EMPLOYER'S VEHICLE. IT'S A TRUCK DRIVING EMPLOYMENT THAT HE 
HAS. AND IF THE COURT IS INCLINED TO INCARCERATE HIM AT THIS 
TIME THEN WE DO ASK THAT HE BE GIVEN SOME TIME TO ARRANGE HIS 
AFFAIRS AND NUMBER ONE TO GET THE VEHICLE BACK TO HIS EMPLOYER 
SO THAT HE CAN—HIS EMPLOYER CAN HAVE THE VEHICLE. 
SECONDLY, HIS FATHER IS SCHEDULED FOR SURGERY NEXT 
WEDNESDAY—THIS COMING WEDNESDAY, DAY AFTER TOMORROW, FOR A 
00 
PROSTRATE SURGERY AND HE WOULD LIKE TO BE THERE TO SUPPORT HIS 
FATHER FOR THAT. SO IF YOU ARE INCLINED TO IMPOSE 
INCARCERATION HE ASKS FOR SOME ADDITIONAL TIME TO DO THOSE 
THINGS AND TAKE CARE OF THOSE AFFAIRS. 
FINALLY, I DO WANT TO APPRISE THE STATE OF ITS 
AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE UNDER PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE PLEA 
AGREEMENT THAT THE STATE WILL MAKE NO RECOMMENDATIONS 
REGARDING SENTENCING, THAT IS THEY AGREE TO SUBMIT THE MATTER 
TO THE COURT WITHOUT COMMENT. I JUST WANTED TO REMIND THE 
STATE OF THAT AND HOLD THEM TO THEIR AGREEMENT. 
THE COURT: I ASSUME FROM THAT, MR. BRICKEY, THAT 
YOU HAVE NO COMMENT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. BRICKEY: WELL, ONLY BASED ON THE FACT THAT 
COUNSEL HAS INDICATED THAT THE DEFENDANT'S FATHER IS THE ONE 
SEEKING ADMISSION FOR SURGERY. IT'S IN FACT HIS STEP-FATHER. 
HIS FATHER IS PASSED AWAY. 
MR. FRIIS: (INAUDIBLE) HE'S MY STEP-FATHER, BUT 
HE'S BEEN MY FATHER SINCE I WAS 11 YEARS OLD. MY FATHER HAS 
BEEN PASSED AWAY—I HAVEN'T SEEN HIM IN 40 YEARS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BRICKEY: I'M READING FOR THE FIRST TIME, YOUR 
HONOR, PARAGRAPH 11. SO IF I MAY— 
I GUESS I'M BOUND BY PARAGRAPH 11. I DID HAVE 
COMMENTS TO MAKE, BUT MR. HOLM HAS INDICATED—ONLY FROM THE 
STANDPOINT THAT THE TIME THAT THE DEFENDANT SPENT WAS ACTUALLY 
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TIME AWAITING FOR AN ENTRY OF PLEA ON THIS MATTER. I THINK 
IT'S IMPORTANT THE COURT UNDERSTAND IT WAS NOT TIME SPENT 
INCARCERATED POST PLEA, AS I UNDERSTAND IT IT WAS WAITING-
THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT BAIL AMOUNT AND BECAUSE OF HIS PRIOR 
HISTORY THAT'S WHAT THE TIME FRAME—WAS ESTABLISHED BECAUSE 
THE DEFENDANT COULDN'T ENTER A PLEA UNTIL—HE HAD MADE CERTAIN 
MOTIONS, THEY WERE DENIED, AND THEN THE MATTER WAS SET FOR 
TRIAL. AND THEN AFTER THE ENTRY OF A PLEA, SO HIS TIME OF 
INCARCERATION SHOULDN'T BE HELD AGAINST THE STATE, YOUR HONOR, 
HE WAS THERE BECAUSE OF SOMETHING HE HAD DONE. 
THE COURT: IT ISN'T A QUESTION OF HOLDING IT 
AGAINST THE STATE, IT'S JUST A QUESTION OF WHETHER HE'S 
ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR THE TIME HE'S SERVED. HE—AND WHAT MR. 
HOLM IS SAYING IS THAT IF WE FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE 
PRE-SENTENCE REPORT THAT HE'S ENTITLED TO THE CREDIT FOR THE 
TIME HE'S SERVED ON THE OTHER CASES, IF HE'S SENTENCED 
CONCURRENTLY IN THIS CASE. I HAVEN'T DETERMINED WHETHER I'M 
GOING TO SENTENCE HIM CONCURRENTLY, BUT I THINK THAT HIS 
ARGUMENT HAS SOME MERIT IF THAT'S THE RECOMMENDATION. 
MR. BRICKEY: YOUR HONOR, I'M WONDERING IF THE 158 
DAYS IS REFLECTIVE OF THE TOTAL TIME HE SPENT INCARCERATED ON 
PREVIOUS MATTERS, OR JUST THIS ONE. I UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE 
INCLUDING THE TWO OTHER MATTERS THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
CONVICTED ON. 
MR. HOLM: YES, THAT'S CORRECT. THE 158 DAYS 
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1 INCLUDES TIME OF SERVICE ON THESE OTHER TWO CASES THAT THE 
2 PROBATION REPORT REFERS TO, YES. IT ALSO INCLUDES TIME THAT 
3 HE WAS AWAITING PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE AS WELL. 
4 MR. BRICKEY: SO I THINK HE WOULD ONLY BE ENTITLED 
5 TO THAT TIME OF INCARCERATION THAT BEGAN ON OR ABOUT FEBRUARY 
6 I 4, 1997 AND UNTIL HE POSTED BAIL AND RETURNED TO CALIFORNIA. 
7 THE COURT: OKAY. ANY RESPONSE? 
8 I MR. HOLM: YOUR HONOR, I GUESS THE BOTTOM LINE OF 
9 THIS CASE IS THAT IF--I CAN SEE WHY MS. KEYES HAS SAID WHAT 
10 SHE SAID. I THINK SHE HAS SOME CONCERNS ABOUT MR. FRIIS AND 
11 HIS COMPLIANCE WITH PROBATION, BUT I THINK IF SHE WANTS TO 
12 ADDRESS THOSE CONCERNS THOSE ARE MORE APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED 
13 IN AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ON HIS PROBATION VIOLATION. 
14 OTHERWISE, WE'VE GOT A SITUATION HERE WHERE IF HE'S PLACED IN 
15 PRISON HE'S STILL BASICALLY ON PROBATION ON THE OTHER CHARGES 
16 BECAUSE NOTHING HAS HAPPENED IN THAT CASE. AND SO I GUESS 
17 FROM ONE STANDPOINT, WE AGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
18 STATE OF UTAH, AT LEAST THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADULT PROBATION 
19 AND PAROLE, IN THE SENSE THAT HIS SENTENCE RUN CONCURRENT. IF 
20 SO, THEN HE'S SERVED HIS TIME AND HE MOVES ON. STILL ON 
21 PROBATION ON THE OTHER CASE AND STILL SUBJECT TO PROCEEDINGS 
22 TO REVOKE THAT PROBATION IF THESE VIOLATIONS ALLEGEDLY 
23 OCCURRED OCCURRED. 
24 THE COURT: MR. FRIIS, ANYTHING YOU'D LIKE TO SAY? 
25 MR. FRIIS: YEAH, LOTS OF THINGS I'D LIKE TO SAY, 
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BUT— 
THE COURT: THIS IS YOUR CHANCE. 
MR. FRIIS: OKAY. I HAVEN'T BEEN OUT LONG ENOUGH. 
YOU VIOLATED FOR NON CHILD SUPPORT, IF YOU REMEMBER CORRECTLY, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I REMEMBER. 
MR. FRIIS: OKAY. I HAVEN'T BEEN ON THE STREETS 
LONG ENOUGH. 87 DAYS I SPENT IN RIVERSIDE COUNTY. BETWEEN 
THE TOTAL OF THIS COUNTY, AND RIVERSIDE COUNTY, AND L.A. 
COUNTY, I'VE GOT 17 MONTHS IN THE LAST 24 MONTHS. I DON'T 
KNOW WHAT THE COURT EXPECTS OF ME. 
THE COURT: I DON'T EXPECT YOU TO SHOW UP FOR COURT 
IN A STOLEN CAR AND UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS, THAT'S WHAT 
I DON'T EXPECT. 
MR. FRIIS: DO YOU KNOW WHAT, IF YOU WOULD LOOK AT 
THIS A LITTLE CLOSER, YOUR HONOR, AND LOOK AT THE $78,000 
DAMAGE THE MAN SAID ON IT, YET HE'S NOT WILLING TO ASK FOR 
ANYTHING BE PAID BACK ON IT— 
THE COURT: I'VE LOOKED AT IT CLOSELY AND I'M AWARE 
OF THAT. 
MR. FRIIS: NOW, DON'T YOU THINK THERE'S A LITTLE 
BIT—I'M SORRY—I OKAY—I'VE GOT TO WATCH WHAT I SAY HERE. 
DON'T YOU THINK IF IT WAS YOU, YOU'D ASK FOR THE MONEY BACK, 
WOULDN'T YOU? 
THE COURT: THE ONLY THING— 
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MR. FRIIS: I UNDERSTAND— 
THE COURT: YES, MR. FRIIS, THAT I CAN NOT ORDER 
RESTITUTION, WHICH I DO NOT INTEND TO DO. BUT THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER YOU ARE GUILTY-
MR. FRIIS: BUT HE DOESN'T ASK— 
THE COURT: —WAS RESOLVED WHEN YOU PLEAD GUILTY. 
MR. FRIIS: PARDON ME? 
THE COURT: THE QUESTION OF WHETHER YOU'RE GUILTY OF 
THE THEFT WAS RESOLVED, IN MY MIND, WHEN YOU ENTERED A PLEA OF 
GUILTY. 
MR. FRIIS: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: SO IT DOESN'T DO ANY GOOD TO ARGUE ABOUT 
WHETHER YOU'RE GUILTY OF COMMITTING THE THEFT. 
MR. FRIIS: OKAY. I UNDERSTAND. 
THE COURT: SO THE QUESTION TODAY IS WHAT PENALTY 
SHOULD YOU PAY FOR COMMITTING THAT THEFT. THAT'S WHAT WE'RE 
TALKING ABOUT. I'D BE GLAD TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON THE MATTER. 
I UNDERSTAND YOU'VE SPENT A LOT OF TIME IN JAIL, BUT YOU DID 
HAVE A PART IN ALL OF THAT. 
MR. FRIIS: I CAN'T SAY ANYTHING, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: WELL, I'M IMPRESSED THAT YOU'RE EVEN 
HERE, MR. FRIIS. THAT SHOWS ME THAT AT LEAST YOUR RESPONSIVE 
TO THAT DEGREE. FRANKLY WE HAVEN'T HAD THE GREATEST LUCK 
COMMUNICATING WITH YOU, AND WHEN I READ THIS PRE-SENTENCE 
REPORT AND READ THAT YOU'D GONE BACK TO CALIFORNIA WITHOUT 
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CONTACTING YOUR PROBATION OFFICER AND THOSE MATTERS THAT MS. 
KEYES HAS PUT INTO THIS REPORT, I BEGAN TO WONDER THAT MAYBE 
YOU WERE GONE. THAT YOU WERE IN THE WIND AGAIN AND THAT WE'D 
BE ISSUING A WARRANT FOR YOU. SO I FIND IT VERY IMPRESSIVE 
AND TO YOUR CREDIT THAT YOU'RE STANDING HERE TODAY AND THAT 
WE'RE EVEN TALKING ABOUT THESE MATTERS. BECAUSE THAT SHOWS ME 
THAT WE'VE REACHED YOU TO SOME DEGREE AND THAT WAS OUR GOAL. 
NOW, I'M CONCERNED ABOUT SOME OTHER THINGS. HAVE 
YOU IN THE PROCESS OF ALL THESE CASES THAT YOU'VE HAD RECEIVED 
ANY TREATMENT FOR DRUG ABUSE? 
MR. FRIIS: YES, I HAVE. 
THE COURT: WHAT KIND OF TREATMENT HAVE YOU HAD? 
MR. FRIIS: IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA. 
THE COURT: AND HOW LONG WAS THAT PROGRAM? 
MR. FRIIS: I WAS IN IT FOR ABOUT SIX WEEKS, YOUR 
HONOR. 
PROGRAM? 
THE COURT: WAS THAT AN IN-PATIENT TREATMENT 
MR. FRIIS: IT WAS AN OUT-PATIENT. 
THE COURT: OUT-PATIENT. ARE YOU STILL ON ANY KIND 
OF A FOLLOW UP OR AFTER CARE PROGRAM? 
MR. FRIIS: I'M GOING TO N.A. MEETINGS AT THE SAME 
PLACE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND IS THAT PART OF A PROBATION 
GRANT OUT OF CALIFORNIA? 
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MR. FRIIS: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO YOU'RE UNDER SUPERVISION 
EITHER BY THE COURT OR BY A PROBATION— 
MR. FRIIS: WELL, IT'S THROUGH STIPULATION. IT'S 
NOT SUPERVISED, BUT IT IS—THERE IS CERTAIN STIPULATIONS THAT 
I HAVE TO MEET. 
THE COURT: OKAY. YOU'RE EMPLOYED AS A TRUCK 
DRIVER? 
MR. FRIIS: AT THE PRESENT TIME, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: FOR WHOM DO YOU WORK? 
MR. FRIIS: A & E TRUCK DRIVING. 
THE COURT: ANDY? 
MR. FRIIS: A & E. 
THE COURT: A & E TRUCKING. 
MR. FRIIS: IT'S A FRIEND OF MINE, RICK ALEXANDER, 
THAT I WENT TO SCHOOL WITH WHEN I WAS A KID, AND HE GAVE ME 
THE JOB UNTIL HE FINDS OUT WHAT I'M GOING TO DO OR WHAT I CAN 
TO DO SO I CAN GET A, NOT A REAL JOB QUOTE, BUT A JOB THAT I 
CAN MAKE SOME REAL MONEY AT. WHICH I HAVEN'T HAD ENOUGH TIME 
ON THE STREETS TO EVEN GET ONE YET. 
THE COURT: WELL, I UNDERSTAND THAT, MR. FRIIS. 
NONETHELESS, YOU CREATED THIS MESS FOR YOURSELF AND NOW YOU'RE 
GOING TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH IT. 
MR. FRIIS: I UNDERSTAND. THAT'S THE REASON WHY I'M 
HERE. 
12 
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1 THE COURT: BEG YOUR PARDON? 
2 MR. FRIIS: THAT'S THE REASON WHY I'M HERE. GOT TO 
3 GET IT CLEARED UP. 
4 THE COURT: AND I APPRECIATE THAT. 
5 YOU'RE ALREADY ON PROBATION TO THIS COURT IN TWO 
6 OTHER CASES. I SEE NO REASON TO IMPOSE PROBATION TERMS IN 
7 THIS CASE. INSTEAD I'M GOING TO SENTENCE YOU TO SERVE 90 DAYS 
8 IN THE COUNTY JAIL. WHEN THAT'S DONE THIS CASE IS OVER. 
9 YOU'RE COMMITTED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE SHERIFF TO SERVE THAT 
10 TIME. 
11 MR. FRIIS: CAN I HAVE ONE WEEK, YOUR HONOR? 
12 THE COURT: WHAT'S THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO A ONE 
13 WEEK DELAY SO THAT HE CAN BE WITH HIS FATHER—STEP-FATHER? 
14 MR. BRICKEY: THE STATE WOULD OBJECT. WE'VE HAD A 
15 DIFFICULT TIME WITH MR. FRIIS, HAVE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME 
16 GETTING HIM HERE. HE'S LEFT THE STATE WITHOUT CONTACTING 
17 AP&P. HE SHOWED UP INTOXICATED WITH TWO PROSTITUTES AND A 
18 STOLEN VEHICLE. AND THEN HE SHOWS UP TODAY, AGAIN I BELIEVE 
19 MR. FRIIS KNOWING THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE INCARCERATED, SHOWED 
20 UP IN A TRUCK WITH THE ABILITY TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT I 
21 NEED TO RETURN THE— 
22 THE COURT: I'M NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE TRUCK. THE 
23 ONLY QUESTION IN MY MIND IS WHETHER HE OUGHT TO BE GIVEN SOME 
24 COMPASSIONATE LEAVE. 
25 MR. BRICKEY: AND THE STATE DOESN'T FEEL THAT MR. 
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1 FRIIS HAS EARNED ANY. HE HAS WRECKED HAVOC ON THE HOMES OF 
2 HIS VICTIMS, HE'S LEFT BEHIND BILLS AMOUNTING TO $17,000. 
3 HE'S EARNED NO RIGHT TO COMPASSIONATE, NOT FROM THIS OFFICE 
4 AND NOT FROM THIS OFFICER OF THE COURT. 
5 MR. FRIIS: MAY I SAY SOMETHING, YOUR HONOR? 
6 THE COURT: ANY RESPONSE, MR. HOLM? 
7 MR. HOLM: YES. 
8 THE COURT: WE'LL GIVE YOU A CHANCE IN A MINUTE, MR. 
9 FRIIS. 
10 MR. HOLM: THANK YOU. HE HAS APPEARED TODAY, YOUR 
11 HONOR. HE ALSO APPEARED AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF HIS PLEA, 
12 APPEARED FAITHFULLY. HE WENT TO SOME EFFORT LAST TIME, 
13 CONSIDERABLE EFFORT. HE HAD TO COME ON THE BUS LAST TIME. 
14 AND THE BUS ARRIVES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE MORNING AND HE SAT 
15 AROUND IN THE COLD FOR SEVERAL HOURS AND HIS COUNSEL, MYSELF, 
16 HAD TO BRING HIM TO COURT. I THINK HE'S—I THINK HE WILL 
17 APPEAR AS HE'S INDICATED. OBVIOUSLY, THE BAIL CAN STILL 
18 REMAIN IN EFFECT IF THERE ARE CONCERNS. SHOULD REMAIN IN 
19 EFFECT. HIS PARENTS HAVE FOOTED THAT MONEY AND PUT IN THE 
20 COLLATERAL FOR THAT BAIL AND SO I DON'T THINK HE INTENDS TO 
21 BETRAY HIS PARENTS TRUST. 
22 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. FRIIS, ANYTHING YOU WANT 
23 TO SAY? 
24 MR. FRIIS: THE STATE SAYS THAT I'VE NOT SHOWED UP 
25 IN COURT. I'VE NEVER HAD A BAIL TOOKEN AWAY OR EVER HAD A 
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1 BENCH WARRANT OUT FOR ME FOR NOT SHOWING UP. I CAN'T REMEMBER 
2 EVER NOT SHOWING UP. I'VE ALWAYS BEEN HERE. 
3 MR. BRICKEY: AND I STAND CORRECTED, THE AMOUNT THE 
4 DEFENDANT OWES HIS EX-WIFE IN CHILD SUPPORT IS $59,000 AND 
5 SOME HUNDREDS AFTER THAT, NOT $17,000. 
6 THE COURT: AND WHAT DOES THAT HAVE TO DO? 
7 MR. BRICKEY: THE DEFENDANT HAS NO—HE'S NEVER 
8 FOLLOWED THROUGH WITH ANY OF HIS OBLIGATIONS. 
9 THE COURT: LET'S LET HIM COMPLETE HIS STATEMENT AND 
10 THEN WE'LL GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO RESPOND. 
11 MR. HOLM: WELL, AND OF COURSE, I THINK HE'S 
12 BREAKING HIS AGREEMENT, YOUR HONOR. 
13 THE COURT: IT SURE SOUNDS LIKE IT. DO YOU WANT TO 
14 WITHDRAW YOUR PLEA? 
15 MR. FRIIS: YES, WE DO. 
16 THE COURT: OKAY. YOUR PLEA IS WITHDRAWN. WE'LL 
17 SET THE MATTER FOR TRIAL. 
18 MR. BRICKEY: WE'D ASK THE DEFENDANT BE TAKEN INTO 
19 INCARCERATION SO THAT HE CAN POST BAIL, YOUR HONOR. 
20 MR. HOLM: HE POSTED BAIL ON THE CASE, YOUR HONOR. 
21 THE COURT: WHAT BAIL HAS BEEN SET AND POSTED? 
22 MR. FRIIS: $10,000, YOUR HONOR. 
23 THE COURT: BAIL WILL CONTINUE IN THE AMOUNT 
24 PREVIOUSLY POSTED. 
25 NOW, LET'S SET THE MATTER FOR TRIAL. HOW SOON CAN 
15 
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BOTH SIDES BE READY? WILL THIS BE A TRIAL TO THE COURT OR A 
JURY? 
MR. HOLM: 45 DAYS, YOUR HONOR. WE NEED SOME TIME 
TO OBTAIN OUR WITNESSES. 
THE COURT: OKAY, MR. BRICKEY, HOW SOON CAN YOU BE 
READY? 
MR. BRICKEY: TWO OF THE WITNESSES ARE DIFFICULT TO 
LOCATE BECAUSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND I'M GOING TO ASK FOR AT 
LEAST 60 DAYS. 
THE COURT: 60 DAYS, OKAY. ONE DAY TRIAL? 
MR. HOLM: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: TRIAL TO A JURY OR TO THE COURT? 
MR. HOLM: IT IS A FELONY SO IT SHOULD BE TO THE 
JURY, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. CAN BOTH SIDES BE READY BY 
DECEMBER 4TH? 
MR. HOLM: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THE MATTER IS SET FOR TRIAL TO THE JURY 
DECEMBER 4TH, 1997, 9 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING. YOU'RE ORDERED 
TO BE PRESENT AT THAT TIME, MR. FRIIS. 
BAIL WILL CONTINUE AS PREVIOUSLY POSTED UNTIL THAT 
TIME. 
MR. BRICKEY: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE WOULD ASK THAT 
THE BAIL THAT CURRENTLY WAS SET ALLOW FOR THE CONDITION AND 
TERM THAT THE DEFENDANT STAY AWAY FROM HIS BIOLOGICAL SON THAT 
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WAS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED BY THE CALIFORNIA COURT, AND I'M ASKING 
ON BEHALF OF THE VICTIM, TO CONTINUE THAT TERM AND HAVE NO 
CONTACT WITH HIS SON. 
THE COURT: OF COURSE, THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE— 
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE HIS SON. 
MR. BRICKEY: NO, IT DOESN'T, BUT I'M ASKING THAT AS 
A TERM AND CONDITION OF THE BAIL THAT HE OBEY THE ORDERS OF 
THE COURT IN CALIFORNIA THAT HE NOT HAVE CONTACT. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF THE ORDER? 
MR. BRICKEY: I DON'T, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF THE ORDER? 
MS. KEYES: NO, BUT YOU WERE THE ONE WHO SENTENCED 
HIM BEFORE THAT SAID HE WAS TO HAVE NO CONTACT WITH HIM AND 
THAT ORDER IS FROM YOUR ORDER AND— 
THE COURT: AND SO— 
MS. KEYES: —ORDER THAT YOU IMPOSED BEFORE THAT HE 
HAVE NO CONTACT WITH— 
THE COURT: THAT HASN'T CHANGED. 
MR. HOLM: BUT THAT'S A CONDITION OF HIS PROBATION 
IN THE OTHER CASE, HE'S STILL BOUND BY THAT IN ANY EVENT, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: HE IS, SO THAT ISN'T CHANGED. 
MR. FRIIS: BUT, YOUR HONOR, THERE IS NO ORDER IN 
CALIFORNIA NOW. 
MR. HOLM: WELL, HE'S TALKING ABOUT THIS CASE IN 
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THIS STATE. 
THE COURT: ALL SHE'S SAYING IS THAT ANY ORDERS THAT 
I IMPOSED AS CONDITIONS OF PROBATION IN YOUR OTHER TWO CASES 
WOULD STILL CONTINUE IN EFFECT AND THEY WILL. 
MR. FRIIS: WHAT SHE'S STATING THEN IS AS LONG AS I 
BRING IN PROOF THAT I HAVE CUSTODY FROM CALIFORNIA THEN I HAVE 
CUSTODY IN THIS STATE; AM I CORRECT? IS THAT WHAT YOU STATED; 
RIGHT? 
THE COURT: WHOEVER HAS JURISDICTION-
MR. FRIIS: I JUST WANT TO CLARIFY. 
THE COURT: WHOEVER HAS JURISDICTION OF THE CUSTODY 
ISSUE AND ENTERS AN ORDER THAT ORDER IS GOING TO BE BINDING IN 
THIS STATE. 
MR. FRIIS: THAT'S ALL I WANTED TO KNOW, SIR. THANK 
YOU. 
THE COURT: DOES THAT CLARIFY THE ISSUE? 
MR. HOLM: I BELIEVE SO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IN THE MEANTIME, YOU'RE ON BAIL, YOU'RE 
EXPECTED TO BE BACK HERE FOR TRIAL, OR IF WE GIVE NOTICE TO 
MR. HOLM TO GET YOU BACK HERE EARLIER, YOU'RE EXPECTED TO BE 
HERE. 
MR. FRIIS: YOUR HONOR, IF I SEND YOU COPIES OF THE 
ARRAIGNMENTS AND THE COURT ORDERS FROM THE COURT, CAN YOU MAKE 
A DECISION AND MAIL IT BACK TO ME SO I KNOW IF I CAN SEE MY 
SON. I HAVEN'T SEEN MY SON IN TWO YEARS. 
18 
1 THE COURT: I CAN'T MAKE A DECISION ON ANYTHING 
2 THAT'S NOT BEFORE ME. 
3 MR. FRIIS: I UNDERSTAND THAT. BUT IF I DO AND I 
4 GET EVERYTHING— 
5 THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN. 
6 MR. FRIIS: IF I MAIL IT TO YOU. INSTEAD OF ME 
7 COMING UP HERE IN FRONT OF YOU BECAUSE IT IS VERY COSTLY AND 
8 TIME FOR ME. 
9 THE COURT: WELL, IT CERTAINLY IS, BUT I SUGGEST YOU 
10 TALK TO MR. HOLM ABOUT THOSE QUESTIONS. I CAN'T GIVE YOU A 
11 LEGAL— 
12 MR. HOLM: I'LL HELP YOU WITH THAT. 
13 MR. FRIIS: ALL RIGHT. 
14 MR. HOLM: THANK YOU. 
15 THE COURT: THAT'S THE ORDER. 
16 * * * 
17 THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I BELIEVE MR. BRICKEY WANTED 
19 TO BRING UP THE FRIIS CASE AGAIN. 
20 THE COURT: MR. BRICKEY. 
21 MR. BRICKEY: YES, YOUR HONOR, I NEED TO ASK THAT 
22 THE FRIIS MATTER BE RECALLED SO THAT I CAN PLACE AN OBJECTION 
23 ON THE RECORD. 
24 THE COURT: OKAY. THE FRIIS CASE IS RECALLED. 
25 MR. BRICKEY: THE BASIS FOR THE STATE'S OBJECTION IS 
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1 THE COURT'S GRANTING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GUILTY PLEA. 
2 ONE WAS BASED, I ASSUME, ON THE FACT AFTER THE COURT ASKED THE 
3 STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD ANY RECOMMENDATIONS OR THOUGHTS 
4 ABOUT THE CONTINUANCE OF ONE WEEK, AND THE STATE OBJECTED. IT 
5 APPEARED AT THAT POINT THAT THE COURT THEN GRANTED THE MOTION 
6 TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA. 
7 THE COURT: NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED AT ALL. 
8 YOU STARTED MAKING COMMENTS ABOUT HOW MUCH CHILD SUPPORT WAS 
9 OWED AND WHETHER HE OUGHT TO BE SENTENCED FOR A LONGER PERIOD, 
10 IS THE WAY I TOOK IT. 
11 MR. BRICKEY: AND THE COURT THEN ASKED ME WHY DOES 
12 NOT THIS MAN DESERVE SOME COMPASSION AND I WAS EXPLAINING THE 
13 STATE'S POSITION ON WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT DESERVED ANY 
14 COMPASSION. I WAS EXPLAINING MY POSITION WHEN THE COURT THEN 
15 GRANTED, AFTER MR. HOLM MADE A VERBAL REQUEST FOR A MOTION TO 
16 WITHDRAW. 
17 THE COURT: THAT'S CORRECT. 
18 MR. BRICKEY: I'D ASK THAT THE MATTER AT LEAST HAVE 
19 A FACTUAL—AN ORDER PREPARED BY THE COURT EXPLAINING THE 
20 COURT'S RATIONAL AND BASIS FOR GRANTING THAT MOTION. 
21 THE COURT: IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT YOU DID NOT 
22 MAKE ANY COMMENTS ON THE SENTENCING PROVISIONS? 
23 MR. BRICKEY: I DID NOT. THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER OR 
24 NOT A WEEK SHOULD BE GRANTED TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO RETURN. 
25 THAT WAS A SIMPLE ISSUE THAT I BELIEVED. THE COURT THEN 
20 
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1 WITHDREW THE GUILTY PLEA AND I FEEL LIKE MY HANDS WERE 
2 HANDCUFFED TELLING ME I CAN NOT MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THEN 
3 THE COURT THEN ASKING ME IF I HAD ANY RECOMMENDATIONS 
4 REGARDING THE ONE WEEK CONTINUANCE. 
5 THE COURT: I DIDN'T ENTER INTO THE PLEA AGREEMENT, 
6 MR. BRICKEY. WHOEVER DID HANDCUFFED YOU, AND YOU DEFINITELY 
7 WERE HANDCUFFED. 
8 MR. BRICKEY: PERHAPS I WAS, AND IN WHICH CASE THE 
9 COURT ASKED ME ONE QUESTION AND HOW CAN I RESPOND WITHOUT 
10 VIOLATING THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT. 
11 THE COURT: OKAY. MR. HOLM, DO YOU HAVE ANY 
12 RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION—TO THE ISSUE? 
13 IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT WE OUGHT TO DO, IF THERE IS 
14 SOME OBJECTION TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA, TO SET THE 
15 MATTER FOR A HEARING—AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND I WILL 
16 DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE 
17 PLEA AGREEMENT. 
18 MR. HOLM: THAT'S FINE, YOUR HONOR, IF YOU WISH TO 
19 DO THAT. I DO COMMENT, I THINK THAT WHAT MR. BRICKEY SAID 
20 EVEN ABOUT THE REQUEST FOR AN ADDITIONAL WEEK, THAT RELATES TO 
21 SENTENCING. 
22 THE COURT: WELL, I GUESS WE'LL HAVE TO DETERMINE 
23 THAT AT THE APPROPRIATE HEARING. SO I WILL VACATE THE ORDER 
24 I MADE PREVIOUSLY ALLOWING MR. FRIIS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA. I 
25 WILL SET THE MATTER FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE'S 
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1 BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT. WHEN CAN YOU BE READY 
2 TO HAVE THAT? 
3 MR. BRICKEY: WHENEVER THE COURT WOULD—JUST FOR THE 
4 COURT'S CLARIFICATION, I DID INDICATE TO COUNSEL AND MR. FRIIS 
5 THAT IF I CONCUR WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT ONE WEEK BE 
6 ALLOWED FOR THE DEFENDANT TO RETURN TO CALIFORNIA AND RETURN 
7 I WOULD CONCUR WITH THAT AND REMAIN SILENT FROM THAT POINT 
8 FORWARD, IF THAT MAKES ANY DIFFERENCE. 
9 THE COURT: RUN THAT BY ME AGAIN. I'M NOT SURE I 
10 UNDERSTAND. 
11 MR. BRICKEY: YOU ASKED ME IF I HAD ANY THOUGHTS 
12 ABOUT MR. FRIIS LEAVING THE STATE FOR ONE WEEK AND THEN 
13 RETURNING TO SERVE HIS 90 DAYS. I WOULD REMAIN SILENT AND SAY 
14 NOTHING AT THIS POINT IF THE COURT FEELS A LITTLE MORE 
15 COMFORTABLE WITH THAT. IF YOU NEED AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 
16 THE MATTER, THE STATE WOULD ASK THE COURT WHAT TYPE OF 
17 INFORMATION WOULD YOU LIKE FOR THAT EVIDENTIARY HEARING? DO 
18 WE NEED A COPY OF THE TRANSCRIPT? 
19 THE COURT: OBVIOUSLY. 
20 MR. BRICKEY: AND SO IN WHICH CASE, WE WILL NEED AT 
21 LEAST 45 DAYS FOR THAT TO BE PREPARED. 
22 THE COURT: I WOULD THINK. 
23 MR. HOLM, ARE YOU GOING TO PURSUE YOUR MOTION TO 
24 WITHDRAW YOUR PLEA? 
25 MR. HOLM: AT THIS TIME, YES, YOUR HONOR. NOW, IN 
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1 THAT 25 DAYS OUR MINDS MAY CHANGE, BUT AT LEAST FOR NOW, YES. 
2 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THEN IT SEEMS TO ME 
3 THE ONLY THING I CAN DO IS SET THAT MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE 
4 PLEA FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
5 CAN BOTH SIDES BE READY ON THE NEXT LAW AND MOTION 
6 DAY? OH, YOU CAN'T. YOU'VE GOT 45 DAYS TO GET A TRANSCRIPT. 
7 WILL BOTH SIDES STIPULATE TO REVIEWING THE VIDEO 
8 TAPE AS OPPOSED TO SPENDING MONEY ON ORDERING A TRANSCRIPT? 
9 MR. HOLM: THAT SEEMS TO MAKE SOME SENSE, YOUR 
10 HONOR. 
11 THE COURT: IS THAT ALL RIGHT WITH YOU, MR. BRICKEY? 
12 MR. BRICKEY: THAT WOULD BE FINE IF WE HAVE A COPY 
13 OF THE VIDEO TAPE MADE AVAILABLE AND MR. BURNS CAN REVIEW IT. 
14 I THINK AT THIS POINT I'M GOING TO HAVE TO STEP ASIDE AS THE 
15 PROSECUTOR. 
16 THE COURT: WHY SO? 
17 MR. BRICKEY: BECAUSE IT MAY REQUIRE ME TO TESTIFY 
18 LATER ON WHAT WAS— 
19 MR. HOLM: UNFORTUNATELY, MR. BURNS MAY HAVE TO 
20 TESTIFY AS WELL AS WITH REGARD TO OUR AGREEMENT. HE'S THE ONE 
21 I ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT WITH. 
22 THE COURT: WELL, MS. STALEY ARE YOU AVAILABLE? I 
23 DON'T KNOW THAT THERE'S ANY NECESSITY FOR YOU TO STEP ASIDE AT 
24 THIS POINT. IF, IN FACT, YOU'RE CALLED AS A WITNESS THEN YOU 
25 MAY HAVE AN ETHICAL DUTY TO STEP ASIDE, BUT I DON'T ANTICIPATE 
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1 ANY WITNESSES BEING CALLED AT THIS HEARING. IT WILL BE MORE 
2 IN THE NATURE OF REVIEWING THE VIDEO TAPE AND HEARING ARGUMENT 
3 AS TO WHAT YOU THINK WAS SAID AND HOW THAT SHOULD BE READ BY 
4 THE COURT AND WHETHER IT VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF THE PLEA 
5 AGREEMENT. 
6 I MR. BRICKEY: WELL, YOUR HONOR, CAN WE HAVE THAT SET 
7 FOR THE NEXT LAW AND MOTION WHICH IS SEPTEMBER 22ND; IS THAT 
8 CORRECT? 
9 THE COURT: I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
10 MR. HOLM: THAT'S TOO SOON FOR ME, YOUR HONOR. 
11 THE COURT: WHY IS THAT? 
12 MR. HOLM: I DON'T KNOW WHY IT IS THAT I KEEP 
13 GETTING MATTERS SCHEDULED DURING THAT WEEK OF VACATION. I 
14 HAVE A WEEK OF VACATION SCHEDULED THAT WEEK. 
15 THE COURT: HOW ABOUT SEPTEMBER 16TH? 
16 MR. HOLM: IF IT'S IN THE AFTERNOON I CAN. I HAVE 
17 A HEARING DOWN IN ST. GEORGE AT TEN IN THE MORNING. 
18 THE COURT: WE CAN DO IT AT 1:30. ANY OBJECTION TO 
19 THAT, MR. BRICKEY? 
20 MR. BRICKEY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
21 THE COURT: SEPTEMBER 16TH AT 1:30. THE DEFENDANT 
22 IS ORDERED TO BE BACK AT THAT TIME. 
23 MR. FRIIS: I HAVE TO BE BACK AT THAT TIME, TOO? 
24 MR. HOLM: YES. 
25 MR. BRICKEY: CAN I ALSO OBTAIN AN ORDER FROM THE 
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1 COURT PROVIDING A COPY, AT NO COST I ASSUME, FOR THE 
2 TRANSCRIPT—FOR THE VIDEO TAPE. 
3 THE COURT: WHY WOULD YOU ASSUME THAT? 
4 II MR. BRICKEY: BECAUSE WE'VE OBTAINED THAT IN THE 
5 PAST, YOUR HONOR, FOR— 
6 THE COURT: I'M SURE YOU CAN GET IT, MR. BRICKEY. 
7 MR. BRICKEY: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
8 THE CLERK: (INAUDIBLE) 
9 THE COURT: NO, HE'S TALKING ABOUT THE PROCEEDINGS 
10 TODAY, IS WHAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT, ISN'T IT? 
11 MR. BRICKEY: THAT IS CORRECT. AND THAT IS MY 
12 UNDERSTANDING AND I WILL MAKE A COPY IF NEED BE OF THE DAY OF 
13 THE ENTRY OF THE PLEA. 
14 THE COURT: I'M SURE WE CAN MAKE THE TAPE AVAILABLE 
15 TO YOU. WE HAVE A COPY HERE. YOU CAN USE THE COURT'S COPY. 
16 I DON'T KNOW THAT YOU NEED YOUR OWN. IF YOU FEEL LIKE YOU DO 
17 YOU'RE FREE TO COPY THAT PORTION OF IT THAT RELATES TO THIS 
18 CASE. 
19 MR. BRICKEY: THANK YOU. 
20 THE COURT: NOW, COUNSEL, IF YOU'LL APPROACH THE 
21 BENCH, PLEASE, BOTH OF YOU. 
22 
23 (WHEREUPON BOTH COUNSEL AND THE COURT HAD A 
24 DISCUSSION AT THE BENCH.) 
25 
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1 THE COURT: WE'LL BE IN RECESS IN THE MATTER UNTIL 
2 1:30 AND WE'LL CALL IT AGAIN AT THAT TIME. 
3 WE ARE IN RECESS. 
4 
5 (WHERE UPON THE COURT WAS IN RECESS.) 
6 
7 THE COURT: WE'RE BACK IN SESSION. IT'S 25 MINUTES 
8 I TO 2. WE'LL RECALL A COUPLE OF MATTERS FROM THIS MORNING. 
9 970112, STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS. 
10 WHAT DID YOU DECIDE TO DO? 
11 MR. HOLM: YOUR HONOR, I THINK WE WOULD LIKE TO 
12 STILL PROCEED WITH THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
13 THE COURT: OKAY. 
14 MR. HOLM: WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK THOUGH THAT IT BE 
15 DONE ON OCTOBER 6TH AS OPPOSED TO THE SETTING THAT WE HAD 
16 MADE. AND THE REASON FOR THAT IS TWOFOLD. ONE IS MR. FRIIS, 
17 I THINK IS STILL WILLING TO WITHDRAW HIS—WILLING TO CONSIDER 
18 TO WITHDRAW HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA. HE WANTS TO GO 
19 BACK TO CALIFORNIA AND TALK WITH SOME POTENTIAL WITNESSES IN 
20 THE CASE. AND— 
21 THE COURT: YOU MEAN IN THE UNDERLYING CASE ITSELF? 
22 MR. HOLM: RIGHT, IN THE UNDERLYING CASE. IT JUST 
23 DOESN'T GIVE HIM ENOUGH TIME TO DO THAT AND BE ABLE TO BE 
24 PREPARED FOR A HEARING ON THE 16TH. SO WE DO ASK THAT WE HAVE 
25 THAT ADDITIONAL TIME TO DO THAT. I THINK THAT THERE IS STILL 
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1 A FAIRLY GOOD CHANCE THAT HE WILL SIMPLY WITHDRAW HIS MOTION 
2 TO WITHDRAW. 
3 THE COURT: ANY RESPONSE, MR. BRICKEY? 
4 I MR. BRICKEY: YES, YOUR HONOR. THE BASIS, AS I 
5 UNDERSTAND, THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING THAT'S CURRENTLY SET FOR 
6 SEPTEMBER 16TH IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE ARGUED 
7 AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 11 HAS 
8 NOTHING TO DO WITH THE UNDERLYING AVAILABILITY OF WITNESSES 
9 THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO MR. FRIIS IN CALIFORNIA. SO THE 
10 STATE WOULD HAVE AN OBJECTION TO CONTINUING IT BEYOND THE 16TH 
11 AND WISH TO GO FORWARD WITH THE HEARING AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED 
12 FOR THE 16TH AT 1:30 P.M. HERE IN PARAWON. 
13 MR. HOLM: WELL, HE'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. THE 
14 WITNESSES THAT WE'RE LOOKING FOR AREN'T FOR THE MOTION 
15 HEARING, OF COURSE, BUT I THINK IT JUST HELPS IN HIS DECISION 
16 MAKING IF HE HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO THESE POTENTIAL 
17 WITNESSES AND SEE HOW GOOD HIS CASE IS, SO TO SPEAK, AT TRIAL. 
18 THAT'S THE BASIS FOR IT, YOUR HONOR. 
19 THE COURT: I'M GOING TO LEAVE THE MATTER SET FOR 
20 HEARING ON THE 16TH AT 1:30 AS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED. WE'LL 
21 PLAN ON HEARING THE ARGUMENTS AT THAT TIME. I HAVE TIME TO 
22 GIVE TO THE CASE ON THAT DATE. I WILL NOT HAVE TIME ON THE 
23 6TH, IT'S ALREADY FULL OF TRIALS. 
24 MR. HOLM: OKAY, YOUR HONOR. 
25 THE COURT: SO I THINK IF WE'RE GOING TO SIT DOWN 
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AND REVIEW THE VIDEO TAPE AND MAKE A DECISION ON THAT WE 
BETTER SET IT AT A TIME WHEN WE CAN GIVE IT THE TIME THAT IT 
MERITS. 
MR. HOLM: OKAY. 
THE COURT: AND MR. FRIIS WILL JUST HAVE TO MAKE 
SOME QUICK PHONE CALLS WHEN HE GETS BACK TO CALIFORNIA TO 
CHECK WITH SOME WITNESSES. 
MR. FRIIS: THAT'S TWO DAYS TURN AROUND, SO THAT'S 
FOUR DAYS. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. 
MR. HOLM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
CONCLUDED.) 
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1 THERE IS TWO OTHER CASES, AND THEN ADDRESSED THE COURT. THE 
2 ONLY TIME THE MOTION WAS MADE WAS AFTER SENTENCING SO THERE 
3 WOULD BE AN ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS NOT TIMELY. 
4 THE COURT: IN DECIDING THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS 
5 MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA THE COURT MUST STEP BACK FROM 
6 ITS ROLE AS A PARTICIPANT IN THOSE PROCEEDINGS ON THE DAY WHEN 
7 THIS SENTENCING OCCURRED AND REVIEW THE MATTER AS A FACT 
8 FINDER AND APPLY THE APPROPRIATE LAW IN THE CASE. 
9 THE FACTS, I THINK, ARE FAIRLY EVIDENT FROM THE 
10 CONTENTS OF THE TAPE AND THE CONTENTS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
11 PARAGRAPH 11 SAYS THAT THE STATE OF UTAH HAS AGREED TO MAKE NO 
12 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING SENTENCING, I.E. TO SUBMIT THE 
13 MATTER TO THE COURT WITHOUT COMMENT. 
14 BY THE MATTER I ASSUME THAT THE PARTIES MEANT THE 
15 MATTERS OF SENTENCING. SO THE QUESTION BECOMES REALLY ONE OF 
16 COMMON SENSE. WHAT MATTERS RELATE TO SENTENCING AND WHAT 
17 COMMENTS RELATE TO OTHER LOGISTICAL AND OTHER MATTERS THAT THE 
18 COURT HAD TO DECIDE THAT DAY. THE COMMENTS MADE BY MR. 
19 BRICKEY AT THE TIME OF THE DISCUSSION OF OTHER CASES AND HOW 
20 THE COMPUTATION OF THE SENTENCING IN THIS CASE WOULD GO IF THE 
21 COURT FOLLOWED THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS RECOMMENDATION IS TO 
22 THE POINT WHERE I THINK THERE'S AN ISSUE RAISED. IF YOU GO TO 
23 THE 12:09 COMMENT REGARDING WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A DELAY IN 
24 THE JAIL SENTENCE OR THE START OF THE JAIL SENTENCE, I AGREE 
25 WITH MR. BURNS. I DON'T THINK THAT RELATES TO SENTENCE. BY 
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THAT TIME THE COURT HAD ALREADY MADE ITS DECISION AND 
ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION AS TO WHAT THE SENTENCE WAS TO BE. THE 
ONLY THING WE WERE TALKING ABOUT WAS WHEN THE JAIL SENTENCE 
WOULD START. SO I THINK THE COMMENTS THAT MR. BRICKEY MADE IN 
RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S INQUIRY AS TO WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE 
A DELAY IN THE START OF THAT JAIL SENTENCE ARE NOT VIOLATIVE 
OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
THE COMMENTS AT 12:01 ARE THE ONES THAT CAUSED THE 
COURT TO GRANT THE MOTION AT THE TIME, EVEN THOUGH THAT'S NOW 
BEEN VACATED, THAT DECISION HAS NOW BEEN VACATED. 
AND THE REASON IS THAT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS-
-IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT THERE IS SOME RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT AS TO WHAT SENTENCE SHOULD BE 
IMPOSED AND THE WAY THAT THE AMOUNT OF TIME WOULD BE 
CALCULATED DEPENDING ON WHETHER HE GOT CREDIT FOR THE TIME 
THAT HE HAD SERVED ON THE TWO PREVIOUS CASES, AND I THINK THAT 
WAS THE POINT MR. BRICKEY WAS ADDRESSING WHEN HE MADE THOSE 
COMMENTS TO THE COURT. 
SO THE QUESTION BECOMES DID—IN MY VIEW, DID MR. 
BRICKEY VIOLATE THE SPIRIT, IF NOT THE LETTER, OF THAT PLEA 
AGREEMENT. 
I'VE DONE A LITTLE RESEARCH ON THE LAW AND TRIED TO 
FIND A CLEAR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. I DON'T FIND ANYTHING 
REALLY CLEAR. I'VE READ MR. BURNS OBJECTION, WHICH CONTAINS 
A LITTLE BIT OF CASE LAW, BUT I DON'T SEE ANYTHING THERE THAT 
14 
00195 
SAYS SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE PROSECUTOR'S OBLIGATION IS WHEN HE 
AGREES THAT HE'S GOING TO SUBMIT SENTENCING WITHOUT COMMENT. 
I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH THAT LIMITS HIM. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME 
THAT THE OLD NBA NOTION OF NO HARM, NO FOUL, OUGHT TO COME 
INTO PLAY HERE. MR. BRICKEY MADE A COMMENT. HIS COMMENT WAS 
INTENDED, I THINK, TO HELP THE COURT SEE WHAT THE 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT WAS AND TO MAYBE TRY 
TO DECIDE WHETHER MR. HOLM'S POINT WAS ACCURATE THAT IF HE 
WAS—IF THE COURT FOLLOWED THAT RECOMMENDATION MR. FRIIS MAY 
HAVE ALREADY SERVED HIS TIME. I DON'T THINK THAT THAT WAS 
HARMFUL TO MR. FRIIS. I DON'T THINK IT WAS INTENDED TO 
PREJUDICE HIM IN ANY WAY. IT WAS A CLARIFICATION. IN FACT, 
I THINK MR. HOLM ENDED UP BASICALLY AGREEING WITH MR. BRICKEY 
AS TO THE WAY THE TIME WOULD BE APPLIED. IN ANY CASE, THE 
COURT DID NOT SENTENCE CONCURRENTLY, THE COURT SENTENCED 
SEPARATELY INDEPENDENT OF THOSE OTHER TWO CASES, DID NOT 
FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT. SO I 
DON'T THINK MR. FRIIS WAS PREJUDICED IN ANY WAY, EVEN IF THERE 
WAS A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT. AND I DON'T 
FIND THAT IT WAS EVEN A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE PLEA 
AGREEMENT UPON REFLECTION ON THE MATTER. THE BETTER PRACTICE 
PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR MR. BRICKEY TO JUST NOT SAY 
ANYTHING, FOR HIM TO JUST SAY I HAVE NO COMMENT, AND LET IT GO 
FROM THERE. BUT I DON'T SEE THAT HIS COMMENT IN TRYING TO 
HELP THE COURT UNDERSTAND THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRE-
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SENTENCE REPORT WAS IN ANY WAY INTENDED TO INFLUENCE THE 
COURT'S JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT THE ULTIMATE SENTENCE SHOULD BE. 
AND THEREFORE I DON'T THINK HE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT IN 
THAT COMMENT. SO I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE 
PLEA. 
NOW, MR. HOLM ARE YOU GOING TO FILE AN INDEPENDENT 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA? 
MR. HOLM: WELL, I'M JUST KIND OF THINKING HERE 
WHILE YOU WERE TALKING, YOUR HONOR. YOU POINTED OUT SOMETHING 
THAT IN YOUR RESEARCH YOU HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE ANY CASE 
LAW THAT ADDRESSES THIS ISSUE ABOUT WHEN THE PROSECUTOR AGREES 
TO NOT MAKE ANY COMMENT AND WHAT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF THAT 
AGREEMENT. I HAVEN'T EVEN TALKED TO MY CLIENT, BUT I'M 
THINKING THAT WE MAY WANT TO FILE A MOTION FOR STAY PENDING 
APPEAL ON THAT ISSUE AND ASK THE COURT FOR A CERTIFICATE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE, BECAUSE I THINK AS YOU RECOGNIZE, IT'S A CLOSE 
CASE, AND MAYBE WE OUGHT TO ALLOW THAT APPEAL TO GO FORWARD 
BEFORE WE DO THAT. 
NOW, OBVIOUSLY I'M NOT PREPARED TODAY. I HAVEN'T 
FILED A MOTION OR ANYTHING ALONG THOSE LINES, BUT I GUESS I'M 
ASKING THE COURT TO GIVE ME SOME TIME TO DO THAT, OR AT LEAST 
TO CONSULT WITH MY CLIENT AND EXPLORE THAT. AND THE OPTION OF 
FILING AN ADDITIONAL MOTION TO WITHDRAW. 
THE COURT: IS THIS ANOTHER MOTION TO DELAY THE 
START OF THE SENTENCE; IS THAT WHAT THAT CONSTITUTES? 
16 
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